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SHOOING THE VULTURES AWAY FROM
THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CARCASS:
ATTORNEY FEES OWED BY DEBTORS FOR
MARITAL DISSOLUTION ARE NOT
DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
CHRISTOPHER V. DAVIS 

“[The] fundamental dilemma of bankruptcy law has always
been whether it is about death or rebirth. Is it a system for
picking a debtor's bones in a more orderly fashion? Or is it
an economic and social safety net that allows debtors to
return to the world? The fact that it is both has never slowed
debate that it should be primarily one or the other” 1

INTRODUCTION

A goal of modern American consumer bankruptcy is to
give “the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of pre-existing debt” 2 – a fresh start – by
discharging the debtor from personal liability on prepetition
debts. A bankruptcy discharge permanently enjoins
prepetition claimants from pursuing the debtor to satisfy their
claims. 3 But there are exceptions to this general rule. 4 One
such exception has been for support obligations owed to the
debtor’s spouse and children. 5 The fresh start policy is clearly
subordinate to a more compelling interest in maintaining the


The author is an attorney and a December 2009 graduate of the
Southern New England School of Law, North Dartmouth, Massachusetts.
1
BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 255 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
2
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
3
11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(1)–(2) (2009).
4
E.g., 11 U.S.C §§ 523(a)(1)–(19) (2009).
5
11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), (a)(15) (2009).
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financial support of family members. 6 The enactment of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (BAPCPA) 7 created a new term for this type of nondischargeable debt: Domestic Support Obligations (DSOs). 8
As a general rule, debts, including attorney fees, are
dischargeable in consumer bankruptcy. 9 Before the
enactment of BAPCPA, many courts found attorney fees
owed by the debtor to the spouse’s attorney incurred during
familial litigation fell into this category of domestic support
debt, 10 and, therefore, treated the fees as non-dischargeable. 11
This interpretation continued to follow the BAPCPA
changes. 12 This Note argues, as a general rule, that courts
should not grant DSO status to attorney fees incurred in
prepetition divorce settlements because the language of the
statute requires it. Further, the overly-broad interpretation
that the majority of courts have adopted could lead to a supercreditor status for one type of attorney’s fee over others and
create an undesirable and unanticipated boon for marital law
6

Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002).
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102, 119 Stat. 33, 27–29 (2005).
8
11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2009).
9
In re Clarkson, 377 B.R. 283, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Wash., 2007)
(Debts for attorney fees incurred prepetition are normally discharged in
Chapter 7 proceeding). A debt is defined as “liability on a claim.”
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2009). A claim is defined as “right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2009).
10
See, e.g., In re Hart, 130 B.R. 817, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991)
(fee owed by debtor to former spouse’s attorney pursuant to agreement
incorporated into divorce decree was nondischargeable); In re Maddigan,
312 F.3d 589, 593 (2d Cir. 2002) (court held attorney fees for
representation in custody litigation were debt for child support and did not
need not be payable directly to a party listed in § 523(a)(5) in order to be
nondischargeable), but see In re Perlin, 30 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994)
(former spouse's attorney lacked standing to contest dischargeability
because debtor owed fee to former spouse, not the attorney).
11
In re Maddigan, 312 F.3d at 593.
12
See, e.g., In re O'Brien, 339 B.R. 529, 531 n.2 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2006) (“Case law construing alimony, maintenance, and support has
largely developed in respect of former § 523(a)(5) whose text is
comparable to and largely mirrors section 101(14)(A)”).
7
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practitioners at the expense of the non-debtor spouse and the
fresh start of “the honest but unfortunate” debtor.
This Note will focus on consumer bankruptcy 13 related to
chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings. Section I provides an
introduction to DSOs and the goals of enforcing them
through bankruptcy. Section I also discusses the impact of
DSO status on the automatic stay, discharge, priority status
for property distribution of the bankruptcy estate, capability
to reach exempt property, and application to attorney fees.
Section II argues that, where attorney fees are not owed to a
spouse, former spouse, or child, and do not fit within an
impact exception, the fees are not DSOs, but instead are
merely general non-secured claims. Finally, Section III
argues that even when attorney fees are owed to, or have
impact on, the spouse, former spouse, or child, courts should
generally find attorney fees are not in the nature of support.

SECTION I

A. Underlying Policy Behind the BAPCPA
Changes to Domestic Support Obligations

The BAPCPA revisions were roughly a decade in the
making, involving several false starts. 14 For legislation that
was so hotly contested, and took so long to pass, there is
precious little documentation from Congress regarding the
decision making process. 15 Four basic policies have been said
13

The Code defines “Consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an
individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.”
11 U.S.C § 101(8).
14
For a thorough discussion of the history of BAPCPA, see Susan
Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (Summer
2005).
15
In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting
that legislative history of act is limited, with no joint statement from a
conference committee, nor reports by floor managers).
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to underlie the BAPCPA changes involving family support
obligations: 16
1. Bankruptcy should interfere as little as
possible with the establishment and collection
of ongoing obligations for support, as allowed
in state and family law courts.
2. The Bankruptcy Code should provide a broad
and comprehensive definition of a Domestic
Support Obligation, and all claims for
Domestic Support Obligations should receive
equal and favored treatment in the bankruptcy
process.
3. The bankruptcy process should ensure the
continued payment of ongoing spousal and
child support and family support arrearages
with minimal need for participation by support
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.
4. The bankruptcy process should allow a debtor
to liquidate non-dischargeable debt to the
greatest extent possible within the bankruptcy
case, and emerge from bankruptcy with the
freshest start feasible. 17
Some of the predicted outcomes of the BAPCPA changes
were reducing the necessity and cost of litigating family law
issues in bankruptcy court, 18 greater consistency between
the Bankruptcy Code and federal child support
enforcement programs, and “a clear recognition . . . that
all . . . [family] . . . support debts are entitled to preferential
treatment in bankruptcy.” 19 Clearly, Congress wanted to
prevent debtors from using bankruptcy as a means to avoid

16

Philip L. Strauss & Karen Cordry, Domestic Support Issues from a
Governmental Perspective, 41 FAM. L.Q. 321, 323–24 (2007).
17
Id.
18
Philip L. Strauss, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, February 10, 2005, http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=1381&wit_id=3993 (last visited June 17, 2010).
19
Id.
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financial responsibilities to spouses, former spouses and
children.

B. Domestic Support Obligations Defined

Even before BAPCPA, the Bankruptcy Code contained an
exception for debts relating to alimony, maintenance, or
support under § 523(a)(5), which made such debts nondischargeable. 20 In 1994, section 523(a)(15), discussed in
detail infra, expanded the breadth of non-dischargeable
marital debts. 21 BAPCPA amended sections 523(a)(5) and
(a)(15). Sections 523(a) and 523(a)(5) now state:

20

The pre-BAPCPA version of § 525(a)(5) excepted from discharge
any debt “to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony
to, maintenance for or support of such spouse or child, in connection with
a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record,
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent
that . . . such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation
of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been
assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political
subdivision of such State) . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(2000). This
language has been held to be sufficiently similar to the language in the 11
U.S.C 101(14A) definition of Domestic Support Obligation so as to make
pre-BAPCPA case law interpreting § 523(a)(5) relevant. Levin v. Greco
(In re Greco) 397 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
21
The pre-BAPCPA version of § 523(a)(15) expanded
nondischargeable debts to those “not of the kind described in paragraph
(5) that [are] incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or
separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or
other order of a court of record, a determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit unless–
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income
or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if
the debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such
business; or

108

Trends and Issues in Bankruptcy

Vol. 4

“(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title [11 USCS § 727, 1141,
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)] does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt –
....
(5) for a domestic support obligation; . . . .” 22
Attorney fees incurred during a divorce proceeding
should not be treated as DSOs. To prove this summation, one
must look at the elements which make up the definition of a
DSO. DSOs are defined under § 101(14A) as:
[A] debt that accrues before, on, or after the date
of the order for relief in a case under this title,
including interest that accrues on that debt as
provided under applicable nonbankruptcy law
notwithstanding any other provision of this title,
that is –
(A) owed to or recoverable by –
(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor or such child's parent, legal guardian, or
responsible relative; or
(ii) a governmental unit;
(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support (including assistance provided by a
governmental unit) of such spouse, former spouse,
or child of the debtor or such child's parent,
without regard to whether such debt is expressly
so designated;

(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2000).
As discussed, infra, in Section III, the two balancing tests laid out in
parts (A) and (B) were removed by the BAPCPA amendments.
22
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2009).
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(C) established or subject to establishment
before, on, or after the date of the order for relief
in a case under this title, by reason of applicable
provisions of –
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree,
or property settlement agreement;
(ii) an order of a court of record; or
(iii) a determination made in accordance
with applicable nonbankruptcy law by a
governmental unit; and
(D) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity,
unless that obligation is assigned voluntarily by
the spouse, former spouse, child of the debtor, or
such child's parent, legal guardian, or responsible
relative for the purpose of collecting the debt. 23
The definition contains four sections, A–D, which must
be met for a debt to be deemed a domestic support
obligation. 24 A DSO is most commonly a court order to make
alimony, spousal maintenance, or child support payments. 25
These kinds of obligations are often designated as support in
the divorce decree, and clearly meet the requirements of
§ 523(a)(5). 26 Whether debts owed to a third-party meet these
criteria is less clear and a source of some litigation. 27
23

11 U.S.C § 101(14A) (2009); see also Wis. Dep’t of Workforce
Dev. v. Ratliff, 390 B.R. 607, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008) (“The
definition [in § 101(14A)] has four separate requirements; all four must be
met for an obligation to be considered a domestic support obligation.”).
24
See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev. v. Ratliff, 390 B.R. 607,
613 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Forgette, 379 B.R. 623, 625 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 2007).
25
James L. Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court:
Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No Fairy
Tale, 41 FAM. L.Q. 249, 268 (2007).
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (fees to
guardian ad litem and psychologist from divorce and child support
proceedings were nondischargeable); In re Wolfe, 26 B.R. 781, 785
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (even without a hold harmless agreement, an auto
loan incurred as a gift for former wife was in the nature of child support
and was nondischargeable), compare with In re Stamper, 131 B.R. 433,
436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (debtor's obligation to holder of auto loan
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The elements of section 101(14A) germane to this Note
are (A)(i), debts “owed to or recoverable by — a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's parent,
legal guardian, or responsible relative”, and (B), debts “in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . of such
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's
parent, without regard to whether such debt is expressly so
designated.” 28 These are discussed in detail in Sections II and
III respectively.

C.

Impact of Domestic Support Obligations
on Other Sections of the Bankruptcy Code
1. Automatic Stay and Discharge

The automatic stay is one of the great protections for the
debtor filing for bankruptcy, as it prevents creditors from
collecting on debts as well as engaging in other activities. 29
may be dischargeable, but hold harmless agreement is non-dischargeable,
and to extent former spouse makes payments on car loan, she is entitled to
recover those payments from debtor as a non-dischargeable obligation); In
re Forgette, 379 B.R. 623, 625–26 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007) (divorce
decree ordered debtor to pay car creditor; ex-spouse had no standing to
bring claim since payments not ordered to her).
28
Since attorney fees are usually established in the divorce agreement
or by the court pursuant to a divorce proceeding, application of
§§ 101(14A)(C) & (D) is straight forward and rarely if ever an issue in the
types of cases analyzed in this Note. Likewise, § 101(14)(A)(ii) concerns
governmental units, and is outside the scope of this Note.
29
11 U.S.C.§ 362(a) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of –
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
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The effect of the stay is automatic upon filing a bankruptcy
proceeding. 30 Generally, the stay remains in effect until
property is no longer property of the estate, or the case is
discharged or dismissed. 31 Although, if a Chapter 7 or 13
case has been dismissed and the debtor re-files within one
year, the stay may only extend for thirty days, 32 and willful
violation of the automatic stay can result in actual damages
and even punitive damages. 33 Upon a successful discharge,
section 524 permanently enjoins actions for debts stayed
under § 362(a). 34
DSOs have special exemptions under sections
362(b)(2)(A)–(C). The stay is not applicable to
commencement or continuation of a civil action “for the
establishment or modification of an order for domestic
support obligations; 35 . . . collection of a domestic support
obligation from property which is not property of the

(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning a corporate debtor's tax liability for a
taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning an
individual debtor's tax liability for a taxable period ending before the
order for relief under this title.
30
Id.
31
11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(1)–(2) (2009).
32
11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2009).
33
11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2009).
34
11 U.S.C. § 524 (2009).
35
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009).
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estate; 36 . . . [and] the withholding of income that is property
of the estate or debtor for purposes of payment of a domestic
support obligation under court order or statute; . . . .” 37

2. Priority Status for Property Distribution

In addition to the non-dischargeability of DSOs, the
policy in favor of protecting the non-debtor spouses and
children is evidenced by Congress giving prepetition DSO
claims first priority under section 507. 38 Prior to BAPCPA,
debts owed for alimony, maintenance or support were only
seventh on the section 507 priority list.
Under section 507(a)(1), prepetition DSOs are given first
priority for property distribution of the bankruptcy estate
subject only to the payment of trustee expenses. 39 Trustees
are also required under sections 704(a)(10) and 1302(b)(6) to
notify holders of DSOs in writing of their rights in collecting
the obligations. 40 Under Chapter 7, priority distributions are
meted out to the creditors at each level of priority. 41 So, first
priority debtors are paid in full before second priority debtors,
and so on, until all funds of the bankruptcy estate are
exhausted. 42 If there is not enough to pay all of the creditors
at a particular level, then the funds are distributed pro rata
36

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) (2009).
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(C) (2009). Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)
the following additional domestic relations actions are not exempt from
the stay:
1. establishment or modification of a domestic support obligation.
2. establishment of paternity
3. an action concerning child custody or visitation
4. an action for the dissolution of marriage, except to the extent that
such proceeding seeks to determine the division of property that is
property of the estate
5. an action regarding domestic violence.
38
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2009).
39
11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2009).
40
11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(10) (2009); 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(6) (2009).
41
11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2009).
42
11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2009).
37
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amongst all the creditors at that particular level.43 For a
Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, it must provide for payment
in full of all claims entitled to priority under section 507,
unless the holder of the claim agrees to another
arrangement. 44

3. Exempt Property

Exempt property is property that cannot be reached by
creditors, and is not considered part of the bankruptcy estate.
A debtor declares exemptions under either state or federal
law. 45 Exempt property can include, among others, value for
a homestead 46 and retirement plans. 47 The Congressional
purpose behind exemptions is to give the “unfortunate
bankruptcy debtor” a base from which to make his fresh
start. 48 Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c), domestic support
obligation debts may be recovered from exempt property:
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property
exempted under this section is not liable during or
after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose,
or that is determined under section 502 of this title
as if such debt had arisen, before the
commencement of the case, except –

43

Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2009).
45
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2009). § 522(b)(3)(A) spells out a calculus for
determining which state’s exemptions may be used based on length of
domicile. This calculus can lead to interesting results, but discussion and
analysis are beyond the scope of this Note.
46
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2009) (roughly $20,000 in property used as
a residence). Massachusetts allows for a $500,000 homestead exemption.
MASS. GEN. LAWS 188, § 1 (2009). While Texas has an unlimited
homestead exemption. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.001(a) (West 2009).
47
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A) (2009).
48
Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption
Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 31 (1983) (discussing bankruptcy exemption policies).
44
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(1) a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (1)
or (5) of section 523 (a) (in which case,
notwithstanding any provision of applicable
nonbankruptcy law to the contrary, such property
shall be liable for a debt of a kind specified in
section 523 (a)(5)). 49
There is a similar protection against exemption for
judgment liens for DSOs. 50

D. An Introduction to DSO
Applicability to Attorney Fees

A creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief
concerning the debtor; . . . .” 51 Clearly, attorneys are creditors
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code). However, a literal
reading of the language of § 101(14A)(A)(i), debts “owed to
or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor or such child's parent, legal guardian, or responsible
relative;” would appear to excluded attorney fees, or fees
owed to any third party, from being included under
§ 523(a)(5). 52 But even before BAPCPA, 53 a majority of
courts found that third-party fees, including fees for attorneys
who represented clients in marriage dissolution, fell under the

49

11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (2009).
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2009).
51
11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2009).
52
Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002).
53
Because the language of § 101(14A) is essentially identical to the
pre-BAPCPA language of § 523(a)(5), courts view much of the preBAPCPA case law involving support obligations as still valid. See, e.g.,
In re Boller, 393 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“In
determining what constitutes debt ‘in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support’ under § 101(14A), the case law construing pre-BAPCPA
§ 523(a)(5), which utilized the same language, is relevant.”) Accordingly,
this Note cites to pre-BAPCPA cases that have not been overturned and
which appear to the author to be consistent with the BAPCPA revisions.
50
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ambit of § 523(a)(5). 54 At least two courts held attorney fees
owed by the debtor to the non-debtor spouse were a unique
exception, and excluded other third parties. 55
Many courts have held attorney fees related to divorce
proceedings are in the nature of support. 56 The function the
award was intended to serve is the crucial issue in making the
determination. 57 The rationale behind some courts holding in
this manner is if the debt were discharged, the non-debtor
spouse would remain liable on the debt. 58 Thus, finding the
debts to be non-dischargeable support furthers the policy of
protecting spouses and children. 59
54

See, e.g., In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998)
(limitation to spouse or child should not be literally applied); In re Miller,
55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (guardian ad litem and psychologist
fees incurred in connection with divorce and child support proceedings
were non-dischargeable); In re Will, 116 B.R. 254, 255 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990) (former spouse's attorneys were third-party beneficiaries with
standing to contest dischargeability of fee); In re Haas, 129 B.R. 531, 535
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (attorney “fees incurred in connection with an
award of maintenance or support are not dischargeable, and it is irrelevant
that the debt is due directly to the attorney rather than to the ex-spouse.”);
but compare In re Perlin, 30 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994) (wife's attorney
lacked standing to contest dischargeability of debtor's obligation to pay
attorney fees because the debtor owed the debt in question to his former
spouse, not to the attorney).
55
See In re Wright, 184 B.R. 318, 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)
(“Generally, an obligation for support must be owed directly to the spouse
to be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5), (citation omitted) with an
exception made for attorney's fees.”); In re Lewis, 39 B.R. 842, 846
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (court limited non-dischargeable debts payable
to third parties for attorney fees. Other third party debt was dischargeable
as it was determined not to be in the nature of alimony and support).
56
In re Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61, 85 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) (citing e.g.,
Macy v. Macy, 114 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997)); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1995).
57
In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983).
58
Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002).
59
Id. But where this policy does not apply, third-party creditors are
not treated as beneficiary of a DSO. See In re Linn, 38 B.R. 762, 763
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (where former spouse would incur no liability if
debt owed directly to court-appointed attorney and psychiatrist in child
custody battle was discharged, then policy of protecting child and spouse
not implicated as only benefit to non-dischargeability would be to thirdparty creditor).
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The following sections will show the majority of courts
have been far too liberal interpreting the relationship between
the DSO provision and attorney fees.

SECTION II

Attorneys Are Not a Debtor’s “Spouse, Former
Spouse, Child . . . or Such Child’s Parent,
Legal Guardian, or Responsible Relative” 60

This section looks at 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i), the
“owed to” clause in the definition of the domestic support
obligation. Many courts have either minimized or ignored
this clause in favor of its sibling, 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B),
which deals with the nature of the debt. 61 However, this is
folly. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) defines the class of entities
to whom the definition of domestic support obligation
applies. The three subsections below support this supposition.
The first subsection looks at the plain meaning of the clause
and finds attorney fees to be outside the ambit of the statutory
language. In the second subsection, an impact exception to
the plain meaning interpretation is explored and adopted.
Finally, cases are reviewed from courts which have ignored
the plain meaning of the statute, or supplanted it with the
language from 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B), and the error of
these arguments is revealed.

60
61

11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) (2009).
See infra Section II.C.
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A. Plain Meaning of Statute Does
Not Include Attorney Fees

As mentioned above, the Congressional policy favoring a
fresh start for the debtor generally leads courts to construe
discharge exceptions strictly and narrowly. 62 While under the
Bankruptcy Code the debtor’s fresh start is subservient to the
debtor’s responsibility to support family obligations 63 and
many of the BAPCPA revisions were designed to protect
receivers of support and alimony, 64 this does not mean that
basic rules of statutory construction should be ignored.
Where a statute’s language is plain, then the court’s
obligation is to enforce the statute according to its terms,
unless the result would be absurd. 65 Section 101(14A)(A)(i)
specifically limits the scope of domestic support obligations
to an identifiable class. 66 While the clause “debts owed to or
recoverable by” in § 101(14A)(A) is broader than the pre-

62

Shayna M. Steinfeld, The Impact of Changes Under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on
Family Obligations, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 251, 268
(2007) (citing to e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1998);
Bellco Fed. Credit Union v. Kaspar (In re Kaspar), 125 F.3d 1358 (10th
Cir. 1997); Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781 (1st Cir. 1997); In re
Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Belfry, 862 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.
1988); In re Van Horne, 823 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1987); Schweig v.
Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Black, 787
F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1986)).
63
Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002).
64
See generally, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 and its Impact on the Practice of Family Law,
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/consumer/vol5num2/Co
nsumerComm3.pdf (last visited June 17, 2010) adapted from Hon. Sandy
Karlan, New Act Enhances Protection of Support Recipients, FLA. FAM.
LAW REP. 2006, Issue 3 (March 2006).
65
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004).
66
“A spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's
parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative . . . .” 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(14A)(A)(i) (2009).
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BAPCPA incarnation, 67 the new definition does not expand
the class of entities to include attorneys. 68 The plain language
of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) limits the discharge exception to a
“spouse, former spouse, child . . . or such child’s parent, legal
guardian, or responsible relative,” and does not include debts
owed to third parties. 69

B. “Impact Exception” to Plain Meaning

Judge Robert Mark, in the pre-BAPCPA case In re
Gentilini, 70 spelled out an exception to the plain meaning of
§ 523(a)(5) in cases where discharge of the third party debt
would impact the former spouse. 71 This Note will refer to it
as the Impact Exception.
While Gentilini was decided before BAPCPA, it deals
with the language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) discussed
above, which in substance mirrors that of former § 523(a)(5).
Gentilini involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in which the
attorneys, who represented the former spouse in previous
divorce proceedings, sought judgment from the bankruptcy
court under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) to except from discharge
fees awarded by the state court. 72

67

See supra note 20 for discussion of pre-BAPCPA language for
§ 523(a)(5), which was replaced by domestic support obligation definition
in § 101(14A) (2009).
68
In re Brooks, 371 B.R. 761, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); but
compare In re Poole, 383 B.R. 308, 313 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2007) (“Since the
language of the new definition includes debts ‘owed to or recoverable by’
a spouse, debts to be paid directly to third parties such as the attorney's
fees and credit card payments would not necessarily be excluded if they
are enforceable and recoverable by the spouse via further proceedings in
the Family Court.”) (internal citations omitted).
69
Id. at 764.
70
In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. 251 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
71
Id. at 254–55.
72
Id. at 251–52.
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In his analysis, Judge Mark cited the Sixth Circuit case In
re Spong, 73 and the Eight Circuit case In re Kline 74 for the
proposition that an exception exists to the plain meaning
interpretation of the statute where “the debt [is] in the nature
of support and the former spouse would be financially
impacted by discharg[e of] the debt.” 75 In Spong, the court
found that whether a debt was owed to a former spouse
should be a matter of substance rather than form, 76 and that
an agreement by the debtor to pay the former spouse’s
attorney for fees incurred during the divorce was in substance
a debt arising from a “paradigmatic third party beneficiary
contract . . . .” 77 Since such contracts are enforceable by both
the third-party beneficiary and the promissee, denying the
debt as owed to the spouse would be an illogical victory of
form over substance. 78 In Kline, the court found a debt to the
attorney of the former spouse non-dischargeable, where if the
debt had been discharged the former spouse would have
remained liable in quantum meruit for the debt. 79
In Gentilini, Judge Mark found that the attorney fees
owed by the debtor were in the nature of support. 80 However,
the Impact Exception did not apply, because at the time of the
bankruptcy petition, the statute of limitations had run on the
retainer agreement between the attorneys and the former
spouse, and the law firm could no longer enforce it. 81 As the
former spouse would not be benefited by the paying of the
fees, nor harmed by non-payment, the plain meaning of the
statute applied. 82 The debt was not owed to the spouse, and
thus the fees were dischargeable. 83

73

In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1995).
75
In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. at 254–55.
76
In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 11.
77
Id. at 10.
78
Id. at 10–11.
79
In re Kline, 63 F.3d at 751.
80
In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. 251, 253 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
81
Id. at 258.
82
Id. at 259.
83
Id.
74
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The Impact Exception makes a great deal of sense. In a
hypothetical case, where a debt to an attorney was created
because the spouse had to bring suit to recover arrearages on
a DSO, such as an alimony or child custody dispute, and the
spouse remained liable to her attorney for the fee, then it
makes sense that the attorney fee would be treated as a DSO
itself. 84 Applying the logic of the court in Spong, that the
debtor owes the fee directly to the attorney should not bar
recovery. To cause the non-debtor spouse to bear the cost of
enforcement would create an unfair burden. Another example
would be a debtor who owes child support, but has not paid
in several months, so the custodial parent brings suit to
collect the funds, perhaps asking the state under state law to
garnish wages of the non-custodial former spouse. If the
custodial parent wins, and the state court awards attorney
fees, it would seem antithetic to the purpose of enforcing the
obligation to allow the debtor to discharge the attorney fee
debt and leave the non-debtor spouse to bear the cost of
enforcement. 85
Thus, the Impact Exception should supersede the plain
meaning of the statute and allow attorney fees to be held nondischargeable where the fee debt is in the nature of support
and the spouse, former spouse, child or child’s parent, legal
guardian or responsible relative remains liable on the fees.
But where there is no impact on a former spouse or child, the
attorney fee should be treated as a general non-secured
dischargeable debt.

84

See generally In re O’Brien, 367 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007)
(holding that attorney fees owed by debtor for post-divorce custody
proceeding was in the nature of support).
85
Attorney fees, interest, and other costs meant to make the spouse or
child whole after debtor’s failure to uphold the support obligation should
not be dischargeable. But purely punitive awards against the debtor,
should be dischargeable, as they do not serve to support the familial
obligation and thus only hinder the debtor in making a fresh start. See
generally In re Smith, 398 B.R. 715 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008) (the court held
that a $50 a day penalty for late alimony payments was not in the nature
of support, and thus claim of former-spouses which consisted only of
penalty fees was dischargeable). The issue of support is discussed in
detail, infra, in Section III.
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C. Overly Broad Interpretation Erroneously
Defeats Plain Meaning of the Statute

Many courts have created expansive interpretations of the
DSO. 86 These interpretations focus primarily, and in some
cases exclusively, on the nature of the debt and minimize or
ignore the “owed to” clause. 87 For these courts, finding that
the debt is in the nature of support is in effect the sin qua non
of the analysis, but all four elements of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)
must be met, and the language of the statute does not imply
one clause is to be given weight to the exclusion of another.
This section looks at rulings of courts which have such broad
interpretations, and discloses the shortcomings of their
analysis.
The Eighth Circuit has one of the most overly-broad
applications. Citing to its holding in Kline, mentioned supra,
the Eighth Circuit in In re Kemp pronounced “[i]t is the
nature of the debt, not the identity of the payee, that
determines the debt’s dischargeability . . . .” 88 This statement
omits the analysis in Kline which focused on the liability of
the spouse, and the per curiam opinion was rendered with
little analysis. Since Kline, the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy
Courts have focused on the “in the nature of support” clause
as a kind of shorthand to all but eviscerate the “owed to”
clause. 89 For example, In re Cavaluzzi is a 2007 Chapter 7
86

See, e.g., In re Staggs, 203 B.R. 712, 722 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996)
(court held guardian ad litem fees to be nondischargeable as in nature of
support); In re Cavaluzzi, 364 B.R. 363, 365–66 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2007)
(court held attorney fees incurred in child-support modification were in
nature of support, and thus nondischargeable); In re Akamine, 217 B.R.
104, 107–08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1488
(10th Cir. 1995); In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998); In re
Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) (citing e.g., In re Macy, 114
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)).
87
In re Akamine, 217 B.R. at 107 (“It is well-settled that as far as
long as a debt is deemed to be 'support' it need not be payable directly to a
child or spouse in order to be nondischargeable.”).
88
In re Kemp, 232 F.3d 652, 653 (8th Cir. 2000).
89
See, e.g., In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 722 (court held guardian ad
litem fees to be nondischargeable as in nature of support); In re Cavaluzzi,
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case where the attorney for the debtor’s former spouse
brought an adversary complaint to have her fees declared
nondischargeable. 90 The fees stemmed from a pre-petition
child support modification hearing. 91 The court in Cavaluzzi
correctly identified the attorney fees for child support actions
can be considered in the nature of support, in part citing to
the holding in the First Circuit case In re Macy. 92 The court
then cites to Kline for the proposition that fees owed directly
to an attorney are non-dischargeable if in the nature of the
support. 93 However, the court’s inquiry stops there. The court
finds the fees were incurred in a child support order, they
were in the nature of support, and they were reasonable. 94
Yet, the court never discusses the liability of the former
spouse. The court in Kline reasoned it had no doubt the nondebtor spouse would be held liable in quantum meruit. 95
Thus, the Kline court’s analysis was similar to the two-prong
analysis required of the Impact Exception. The Bankruptcy
Court in Cavaluzzi omits the liability step without comment
(and with the un-cited, though applicable blessing of the
Eighth Circuit in Kemp). However, this analysis fails to apply
the law, either the plain language of the statute or the Impact
Exception, correctly.

364 B.R. at 365 (court held attorney fees incurred in child-support
modification were in nature of support, and thus nondischargeable).
90
In re Cavaluzzi, 364 B.R. at 364.
91
Id.
92
In re Cavaluzzi, 364 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2007) (citing
In re Macy, 114 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
In re Kline, 63 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1995).
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The Eighth Circuit is not alone in this overly-broad
interpretation. The Tenth Circuit, in In re Miller, held the fees
owed by the debtor directly to a guardian ad litem and court
appointed psychiatrist were nondischargeable. 96 The court
found the proper emphasis was on the nature of the debt, and
not the identity of the payee. 97 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
cited to the “precedent” of its holding in the case In re
Jones. 98 However, as Judge Mark adroitly points out in
Gentilini, “[t]he Miller court felt bound by Jones, even
though it specifically noted that Jones did not address the
issue of to whom the debt was payable.”99 Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit in In re Chang held “the identity of the payee is
less important than the nature of the debt.” 100 But the court
did not explain under what theory of statutory interpretation
one necessary element of a statute becomes less important
than another. 101
The examples above make clear that many jurisdictions
are basing there decisions on an incomplete analysis, and may
be assessing fees to the debtor in ways that do not meet the
stated goal of benefiting the spouse, former spouse, or child
by enforcing the debtor’s familial obligations. Not only is it
an unwarranted expansion of the plain meaning of the statute,
but as one court aptly stated, “[e]xcluding these debts from
discharge will not further the bankruptcy goal of a fresh start
unburdened by old debts, [n]or will it protect spouses, former
spouses and children from being injured by a debtor's
discharge.” 102 In the case of attorney fees, the benefit to the
attorney would come completely at the expense of the
debtor’s fresh start.

96

In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1488 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1490.
98
Id. at 1489 (citing In re Jones, 9 F.3d 878 (10th Cir.1993)).
99
In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. 251, 256 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing
In re Miller, 55 F.3d at 1489).
100
In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
101
In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. at 256.
102
In re Linn, 38 B.R. 762, 763 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted).
97
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SECTION III

Attorney Fees Generally Are Not Support Obligations

Having established attorney fees may be DSOs if the
spouse or child remains liable and if the fees are in the nature
of support, the next logical step is to discuss when attorney
fees should be considered in the nature of support. Here the
case law is fractured. Section 101(14A)(B) provides that the
DSOs must be “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support . . . of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor or such child's parent, without regard to whether such
debt is expressly so designated.” 103 But just what constitutes
support is the subject of much litigation, and there is a
general lack of agreement among the courts in the factors that
should be used to resolve these cases. 104
The term support is not defined in the Code, but most
courts do agree on three principles of review. First, generally
exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy should be viewed
narrowly, the term “support” should be interpreted broadly as
applied to domestic support obligations. 105 Second, what
constitutes support is a matter of federal bankruptcy law, not
controlled by the state court’s interpretation.106 And third,
103

11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B) (2009).
See James L. Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy
Court: Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No
Fairy Tale, 41 FAM. L. Q. 249, 269–70 (2007).
105
See, e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir.1998)
(holding that the usual strict construction of exceptions to discharge is not
applicable to support obligations, in light of a “longstanding . . . policy of
protecting a debtor's spouse and children when the debtor's support is
required.”); In re Maddigan, 312 F.3d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 2002) (“there is
ample justification for construing certain statutory terms broadly, albeit
with the confines of the narrow-construction rule. We have clearly stated
that among the concepts to be given broad interpretation is the meaning of
'in the nature of support.'”) (citation omitted).
106
In re Chase, 392 B.R. 72, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“an
independent inquiry to determine whether a debt characterized as
alimony, maintenance, or support [is] actually in the nature of alimony,
104
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based on various factors, the intent of the parties or the
divorce court is the driving force in the bankruptcy court’s
examination. 107
It is these varying factors, and the weight to be given to
each, where the courts differ. 108 This results in courts looking
at similar fact patterns to reach very different conclusions. 109
Courts have held that the crucial issue in making the
determination of whether third-party debts, including attorney
fees, are support is the function the award was intended to
serve. 110 The following subsections argue that because the
term support is amorphous and undefined in the Code, the
plain meaning of the statute cannot be applied, and so the
underlying policies drive the analysis. Then the policies for
treating attorney fees as support obligations are weighed
against reasons not to hold them as such. This analysis leads
to the conclusion that attorney fees should generally not be
treated as DSO obligations.

maintenance, or support . . . is made under federal, not state, law, and is
not governed by state law treatment of the obligation nor by the label the
parties have used to describe the obligation.”); In re Hazelton, 304 B.R.
145, 152 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003) (“Federal standards, not state law, are
used when determining whether a debt is in the nature of either alimony,
maintenance or support.”).
107
See, e.g., In re Sanabria, 275 B.R. 204, 207 (Bankr. D. N.J.
2002)(“whether an obligation falls within the category of support or
alimony, as opposed to a property settlement depends upon the intent of
the parties at the time of the settlement agreement.”); In re Pulley, 355
B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) (In order to except debt from
discharge, “[t]he creditor must show that the parties intended to create a
support obligation and that the obligation actually provides necessary
support.”); In re Hammermeister, 270 B.R. 863, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
2001) (“the obligation constitutes support only if the state court or parties
intended to create a support obligation"); In re Turner, 266 B.R. 491, 497
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (“whether the obligation is in the 'nature of
support' requires examination of parties' or court's intent and the
substance of obligation.”).
108
See, infra, notes 108 and 109.
109
Musselman, supra note 104, at 269.
110
In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983).
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A. The Factors

Factors that some circuits have used to guide their
decisions as to whether attorney fees constitute a
nondischargeable debt are: (1) the language of the divorce
decree; (2) the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of
the divorce decree; and (3) the function served by the award
of attorneys' fees at the time of the divorce decree. 111 But
other circuits look at whether the support maintained daily
necessities of the spouse or child, 112 or whether a property
award appears to “assuage need.” 113 These tests all seem to
boil down to a “totality of the circumstances” analysis.
Though, in this context, the totality of the circumstances
might be as amorphous as the phrase “in the nature of
support” itself.
Courts have held that attorney fees awarded for collection
of alimony, maintenance and support obligations are so
intertwined as to follow the underlying obligation. 114 For
example, the Tenth Circuit has a broad interpretation that
looks at the nature of the underlying action, not the intent of
the parties or the court. 115 The Tenth Circuit Court held, in
part, that absent unusual circumstances “court-ordered
attorney fees arising from post-divorce custody action are
deemed in the nature of support.” 116 But this interpretation is
too broad, and courts that have rejected this logic in other
§ 523(a) exemption situations. 117

111

In re Hale, 289 B.R. 788, 796 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.2003).
In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 763 (3rd Cir. 1990).
113
In re Smith, 398 B.R. 715, 721 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008).
114
See, e.g., In re Macy, 192 B.R. 802, 806 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
115
See In re Jones, 9 F.3d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1993).
116
Id. at 881.
117
In re Ziegler, 109 B.R. 172, 175–77 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989)
(court ruling on attorney fees in § 523(a)(6) case stated that attorney fees
should not be held non-dischargeable simply because of the underlying
debt was non-dischargeable).
112
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The appropriate analysis is expressed by Judge Isicoff in
In re Lopez. 118 In that case, the former spouse argued that
because the claim for attorney fees arose from a custody,
parentage, or visitation matter, they were in the nature of
support. 119 But the court found that interpretation of the
support to be too broad, stating “not every obligation created
in connection with, or arising out of, a domestic matter, ipso
facto, qualifies as a domestic support obligation.” 120 The state
court’s order stated the fees were awarded based on the bad
faith of the debtor during the custody proceeding, and “not
based upon the respective wages or ability of parties to
pay.” 121 Thus, the fees were not in the nature of support.122 In
other words, just because the action arises from a divorce
decree, does not mean the attorney fees assessed are domestic
support obligations.
But that begs the question; under what conditions should
attorney fees be considered in the nature of support? To
answer, one must look at the policy arguments in favor of,
and in opposition to, attorney fees as domestic support
obligations.

B. Policy Argument for Finding DSO is Weighed

Against Potential Harm to Debtor and Family

1. A Look at the Policy Arguments
for Making Attorney Fees DSOs

There are two basic policy arguments favoring the
treatment of attorney fees arising from divorce, separation,
and the like and owed by the debtor to either the former
spouse’s attorney or the former spouse as DSOs:
118

In re Lopez, 405 B.R. 382 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
Id. at 384.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 385.
122
Id.
119
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(1) protecting the non-debtor spouse and children—which has
been reviewed in length in the sections above, 123 and (2) to
prevent depleting the pool of attorneys willing to take on such
cases. As will be shown in the following section, these
arguments are unpersuasive especially in light of the changes
to BAPCPA which make 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) a much
more salient provision to apply to attorney fees in Chapter 7
cases. In the first case, treating attorney fees as DSOs may
actually hurt rather than help the non-debtor spouse or child.
In the second instance, the policy does not hold up to close
scrutiny. The rationale of the courts that have held attorney
fees related to divorce proceedings to be in the nature of
support, is that if the debt were discharged, the non-debtor
spouse would remain liable on the debt. 124 Thus, finding the
debts to be non-dischargeable support furthers the policy of
protecting spouses and children. 125
Another argument put forth is that to find attorney fees as
non-support obligations would lead to a depletion of the pool
of attorneys willing to take on these cases. 126 The gist of the
second argument is that courts fear if attorney fees are not
treated as support obligations, spouses and children may not
find adequate counsel. “[A] spouse's need for adequate legal
representation in a lawsuit affecting the marital status is not
materially different from those other needs—from

123

See Section I.D., supra.
Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002); see also
generally In re Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) citing e.g.,
Macy v. Macy, 114 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d
Cir. 1981); In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1995).
125
Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002); But where this
policy does not apply, third-party creditors are not treated as beneficiary
of a DSO. See In re Linn, 38 B.R. 762 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (where
former spouse would incur no liability if debt owed directly to courtappointed attorney and psychiatrist in child custody battle was discharged,
then policy of protecting child and spouse not implicated as only benefit
to non-dischargeability would be to third-party creditor).
126
Sheryl L. Scheible, Defining “Support” Under Bankruptcy Law:
Revitalization of the “Necessaries” Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1, at 44
(1988) (citing to In re Dupont, 19 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Richards v. Loncar, 14 Bankr. 276, 278 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981)).
124
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subsistence to the education of children—which fall within
the more common meaning of alimony or support . . . .” 127
This second argument is persuasive on the surface, but it
fails for three reasons: (1) The adequacy of counsel argument
can be shared by all other attorneys; (2) there is nothing in the
historical record to indicate that Congress intended to give a
higher priority over all other advocates to marital law
attorneys who represent divorce clients whose spouses end up
owing them attorney fees; and (3) because non-support
attorney fees can be considered non-dischargeable marital
debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), family law practitioners in
this situation can still avoid discharge in the vast majority of
bankruptcies without necessitating a declaration of the debt as
a DSO.

a. Adequacy of Counsel

First, as a general rule in bankruptcy, attorney fees are
dischargeable. 128 That a client who owes a practitioner
money might declare bankruptcy and be able to discharge his
fee debt is a risk most practitioners take. The debtor’s family
law practitioner’s fees are dischargeable, 129 as are the fees of

127

In re Soforenko, 203 B.R. 853, 862 (Bankr. .D. Mass. 1997)
(quoting Goldman v. Roderiques, 349 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1976)).
128
In re DeRoche, 434 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Consistent
with this philosophy, we have held that, absent bad faith or harassment,
attorney’s fees are not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues
'peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.' The Bankruptcy Code does contain
some fee provisions. However, it does not contain any provisions that
create a general right for the prevailing party to be awarded attorney’s
fees in federal bankruptcy litigation. Thus, we have held that ‘[t]here is no
general right to recover attorney's fees under the Bankruptcy Code’”)
(citations omitted); Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395, 396 (6th Cir.
2005) (debt for pre-petition legal fees not excluded from discharge under
§ 523(a)).
129
In re O’Brien, 367 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007)
(debtor’s divorce attorney cannot claim fee award as domestic support
obligation).
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attorneys whose clients have earned malpractice awards. 130
Even a judgment lien that an attorney may have acquired
against a former client can be discharged if it is levied against
exempt property. 131
The same adequacy of counsel argument made for family
law practitioners who represent a client who ends up the
holder of a Domestic Support Obligation can be made by
practitioners in any number of areas where the judgments and
accompanying attorney fees are dischargeable. 132 Yet
attorney fees owed in these other cases are deemed
dischargeable.

b. No Congressional Intent

Secondly, nowhere in the definition of DSO in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(14a), nor in its application in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5),
nor in the congressional history of 1978, or the amendments
in 1986, 1994, or 2005, does it appear that attorney fees were
contemplated as domestic support obligations. 133 This is
court-invented interpretation, and as discussed in the sections
below, the results of holding attorney fees as DSOs could
have far reaching and undesirable results.

130

Hughes v. Sanders, 469 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2006) (default
malpractice award was dischargeable).
131
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2009).
132
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 (1998) (holding that
medical negligence is not “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6)
exemption, the phrase only applies to intentional torts, and therefore debt
remains dischargeable).
133
In re Brooks, 371 B.R. 761, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (“[I]n
going out of its way to define, in newly enacted section 101(14A), the list
of entities . . . that may assert claims related to a ‘domestic support
obligation,’ Congress did not add attorneys to the list, though it certainly
could have.”).
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c. Non-Support Obligations Arising from
Divorce Proceedings are Not Dischargeable

Section 523(a)(15) of the Code applies to all divorce
related debts owed to the spouse, former spouse, or child of
the debtor that are not domestic support obligations. 134 The
operative clause of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) related to
applicability changed under BAPCPA to essentially mirror
that of the pre-BAPCPA § 523(a)(5). 135 Like a DSO under
§ 523(a)(5), a non-domestic support obligation, owed to a
spouse, former spouse, or child which arose under a divorce
decree or settlement agreement, under § 523(a)(15) does not
require a complaint to be filed. 136 Whereas other debts which
may be excepted from discharge must be filed within sixty
days of the first set meeting of creditors. 137 Thus, attorney
fees can be argued as non-dischargeable non-support
obligations under § 523(a)(15). This would minimize the
inadequate support argument because the debts would still
remain non-dischargeable, so the marital law attorneys could
still get paid.

134

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2009).
11 U.S.C.§ 523 (a)(15) (2009) reads “to a spouse, former spouse,
or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a
court of record . . . .”; compare with “to a spouse, former spouse, or child
of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse
or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or
other order of a court of record . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994).
136
11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2009). FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c) provides
that a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c)
shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting
of creditors. Section 523(c) encompasses § 523(a)(2), § 523(a)(4), and
§ 523(a)(6). Previous to the 2005 BAPCPA changes, § 523(c) had also
included § 523(a)(15).
137
Id.
135
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As is discussed below, while the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)
exception does not have the same breadth as 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5), particularly in Chapter 13 cases, neither does it
carry with it all of the power of a DSO which can potentially
harm the debtor and the family member to which obligations
are owed. 138

2. A Policy Argument Against
Treating Attorney Fees as DSOs

Even before BAPCPA, support obligations under the old
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) were exempt from discharge, but the
BAPCPA changes to the provisions for exemptions 139 and
priorities 140 give domestic support obligations unprecedented
reach into the bankruptcy estate and beyond for collection.
Congress did not contemplate treating attorney fees as DSOs,
moreover, it runs counter to the goal of protecting the spouse
and child, and does so at the expense of other creditors and
the “honest but unfortunate” debtor’s “fresh start.” The
following subsections review the potential negative impact on
the debtor and his spouse, former spouse, and child if DSO
status is extended to attorney fees.

a. Reaching through to Exempt Property

Exempt property is one of the great protections of
bankruptcy; it ensures the debtor exits after a discharge with
enough assets to begin his “fresh start.” A judgment lien for a
malpractice case, and the accompanying contingency fees,

138

Section III.C., infra, looks at the breadth of § 523(a)(15) in the
context of chapter 13 bankruptcy; Section III.B. looks at the dangers of
treating attorney fees as DSOs.
139
11 U.S.C. § 522 (2009), discussed, supra, in Section I.C.3.
140
11 U.S.C. § 507 (2009), discussed, supra, in Section I.C.2.
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may be discharged. 141 However, if the family law
practitioner’s fees are owed, not by his client, but by a
bankrupt opponent, they are treated as a DSO, and the
practitioner can then gain access to the debtor’s exempt
property. 142
While courts have held that a trustee cannot seek to
collect exempt property to satisfy a DSO, 143 former spouses
have successfully brought such actions. 144 Ostensibly, if
attorney fees are DSOs, then attorneys will be able to pilfer
the coffers of exempt property to recover their fees. No cases
directly on this point have been recorded since 2005. The
expansive
language
of
11
U.S.C.
§ 522(c)(1),
“notwithstanding any provision of applicable non-bankruptcy
law to the contrary”, implies this could even allow the
attorney to avoid state law exemptions for homestead and
other property. 145 One author has opined that DSO creditors
must exhaust all exempt assets before reaching down into
141

See Hughes v. Sanders, 469 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2006) (default
malpractice award was dischargeable).
142
Claude R. Bowles, Expecting the Unexpected: Unusual Domestic
Relations Law Issues That May Arise Under the BAPCPA, 41 FAM. L.Q.
343, 352–53 (2007).
143
In re Ruppel, 368 B.R. 42, 42 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (Chapter 7
debtor's exempt property was not property of his bankruptcy estate subject
to administration by trustee, and thus trustee had no authority to liquidate
exempt non-estate property for benefit of DSO claimant.); In re Quezada,
368 B.R. 44, 45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (Code provision added by
BAPCPA, to render exempt property liable for certain tax debts and
DSOs, did not limit debtor's right to claim all exemptions otherwise
available to him, and did not provide basis for disallowance of homestead
exemption. While property might be subject to execution by DSO
creditor, this did not mean that trustee could administer this exempt
homestead property for benefit of DSO creditors); In re Vandeventer, Jr.,
2007 368 B.R. 50, 54 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007)(The trustee cannot reach the
exempt property, because it is not part of the estate), but see In re Galtieri,
172 Fed. Appx. 397 (3d Cir. 2006).
144
In re Crum, 414 B.R. 103, 110–11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (slip
opinion) (holding debtor's IRA account to be generally exempt, but not
exempt from domestic support obligation); In re MacGibbon, 383 B.R.
749 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2008) (neither former wife nor the State violated
the automatic stay in enforcing, assessing, and collecting support from
exempt assets).
145
Bowles, supra note 142, at 352–53.
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nonexempt property. 146 While the rationale behind avoiding
exemptions to obtain funds for support debts like alimony
and child support fits with the policy discussed previously, 147
and many may applaud allowing a former spouse or child to
pursue exempt property of a deadbeat father who refuses to
pay child support or alimony, there are many debts related to
the dissolution of a marriage that bear no such social stigma,
and there is no compelling policy explanation for extending
this power to attorney fees.
There may be an even more far-lasting and detrimental
result for the family members to which a DSO is owed.
Allowing the attorney to raid the equity in a home or the
retirement account of a debtor will mean that the debtor is
hindered that much more in her attempt at a fresh start. If, as
a result of this hindrance, the debtor is unable to meet
domestic support obligations to the spouse or child, payment
of the attorney fees will have acted to thwart the very changes
BAPCPA seeks to ensure.

b. Priorities: Pro Rata Distribution
might hurt the non-debtor client

Treating attorney fees as DSOs means that the attorney
fees will share priority status with other DSOs which may
have arrearages, such as child support and alimony. If
attorney fees are given domestic support obligation status by
the bankruptcy court, then in Chapter 7 cases where the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate lacks sufficient funds to pay both
the DSO owed directly to the family member and the DSO
owed to the attorney, the pro rata distribution would have the
effect of diminishing the amount recoverable by the spouse
and child. 148 Certainly, diminishing the support payments
146

Edward W. Vopat, Domestic Support Obligations Under the
Revised Bankruptcy Code, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3, 20 (June 2008).
147
See Sections I.D. and III.B.1., supra.
148
11 U.S.C. § 726 (2009) (“[P]roperty of the estate shall be
distributed . . . first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in
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was not an objective of Congress, nor a desirable result as a
matter of policy.
It is true this result will not occur often because in most
Chapter 7 bankruptcies there is nothing left to distribute once
the secured creditors have been satisfied. 149 However, it can
occur and will occur in at least some circumstances, thus it is
reason enough to seek another avenue for collection of these
fees.
Therefore, as a general rule, conferring DSO status to
attorney fees does not enhance the policy of protecting the
spouse, former spouse, or child.

c. Solution: Apply Impact Exception and
Treat Attorney Fees as § 523(a)(15) debts

Attorney fees generally need not be treated as DSOs to
protect the support due to a debtor’s family. In cases where
the debtor’s spouse, former spouse, child or the party
responsible for the child remains liable for attorney fees, the
impact exception should be applied to the debt, but rather
than holding the debt in the nature of support, the attorney
fees should be treated as nondischargeable divorce-related
debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

the order specified in, section 507 of this title . . . .”). This is not true of
Chapter 13 cases, though. A Chapter 13 plan, under § 1322(a)(2), must
“provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims
entitled to priority under section 507 of this title[11 USCS § 507], unless
the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such
claim; . . . .” So, under Chapter 13, the debt must be paid, but the order
of priority doesn’t appear to be specifically enforced as it is in Chapter 7.
149
See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 and its Impact on the Practice of Family Law 5–6,
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/consumer/vol5num2/Co
nsumerComm3.pdf adapted from Hon. Sandy Karlan, New Act Enhances
Protection of Support Recipients, FLA. FAM. LAW REP. 2006, Issue 3
(March 2006).
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i. Some Courts have used
§ 523(a)(15) for attorney fees

Section 523(a)(15) was added to the Bankruptcy Code in
1994, and expanded the marital debts that could be made
dischargeable beyond support obligations. 150 But it contained
a balancing clause that was difficult for courts to apply. 151
BAPCPA revised the language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15),
which now reads:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141,
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt–
....
(15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph
(5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a
divorce or separation or in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other
order of a court of record, or a determination made
in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit; . . . . 152
150

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994). H.R. REP. 103-835, P.L. 103-394,
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
151
In re Klem 362 B.R. 585, 592 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“sorting
out the various burdens ‘of going forward’ under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)
as it appeared prior to October 17, 2005 is to solve a Gordian's Knot”).
The following is a very cursory explanation of the balancing test: Once
the court determined that the debt would fall within the parameters of
§ 523(a)(15), the court would then have to determine “whether the debtor
has the ability to pay the obligation in question out of income not
reasonably necessary for the debtor's support or the support of a
dependant or for the operation, preservation, or continuation of the
Debtor's business . . . . [If not,] the inquiry ends; the debt is dischargeable.
However, if the debtor does have the ability to pay the debt at issue, the
Court must then weigh the benefit to the debtor of discharging such debt
against the detriment to the nondebtor spouse or child of
nonpayment . . . . If the benefit to the debtor outweighs the detriment to
the nondebtor spouse or child, the debt is dischargeable.” In re Soforenko
203 B.R. 853 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (citations omitted).
152
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2009).
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Just like in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) cases, there is no
requirement that an adversary proceeding be filed, so debtors
are not able to discharge debts that fit into § 523(a)(15) based
on a failure of the creditor to object. 153 This section was
originally treated as only applying to property settlements,
but with the BAPCPA changes, the provision need not be
read so narrowly. 154 As the plain language of the statute
states, it applies to all divorce-related debt not described in
§ 523(a)(5). 155 The only difference is § 523(a)(15) debts are
not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 156
This is due to a logical inconsistency in the Code, and is
considered in the next subsection. 157
Some courts have already found attorney fees in Chapter
7 cases to apply under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). For example,
in a case where the divorce decree awarded only a share of
the marital property to the non-debtor spouse, the attorney
fees were held non-dischargeable. 158 Another court found
attorney fees to be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(15),
even though a portion of the debt owed was for a child
support obligation that was non-dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(5). 159 In that case, the court held it did not have to
determine whether obligations imposed were in the nature of
support or property settlements, because the distinction
served no practical purpose. 160 The court held that child
support arrearage was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5),
153

11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2009). See supra note 135.
In re Johnson, No. 07-5054, 2007 WL 3129951, 3 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2007) (“The plain language of the statute now provides that all debts
which do not qualify as domestic support obligations are
nondischargeable.”).
155
Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2009).
156
See, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2009) text, infra, at Section III.C.2.
157
See, infra, Section III.C.2.
158
In re Cunningham, 2008 WL 6192259, 3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008)
(slip opinion).
159
In re Golio, 393 B.R. 56, 63 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008).
160
Id. at 62 (“[T]his Court need not make a determination on whether
the amounts awarded under the Judgements at issue constitute domestic
support obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) if the Plaintiff can
demonstrate that the Judgments would be nondischargeable in any event
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) . . . .”).
154
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and without clearly elaborating its reasons why, the court
then found the judgment for the attorney fees in the state
court proceedings to be non-dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(15). 161
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) in Chapter 7 cases, just like
with a § 523(a)(5) debt, 162 the attorney can still proceed with
collection activity against non-exempt property of the debtor
once the debtor is out of bankruptcy. While, the attorney
won’t have the potential to avoid the automatic stay, or raid
the debtor’s exempt property during the bankruptcy process,
as she might be able to as a DSO, 163 the marital practitioner is
provided a level of security for fees. This should help quell
the policy concerns of those who fear that if attorney fees are
not DSOs then a dependent spouse may not receive adequate
counsel. But what about Chapter 13 cases discharged under
§ 1328(a)?

ii. Chapter 13 Contingency

Unlike a DSO, a § 523(a)(15) debt may be discharged in
Chapter 13 cases. 164 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), which lists nondischargeable debts, omits 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) debts from
the list. 165 This is a logical inconsistency that Congress needs
to fix. This leaves courts with the unappetizing choice
between finding attorney fees to be DSOs in Chapter 13 cases
161

Id. at 63.
11 U.S.C. § 727(b) excludes allowed 523 exceptions from
discharge. Non-discharged debts remain actionable after the bankruptcy
case is discharged.
163
See discussion, supra, at Section I.C. regarding the automatic stay
and exemptions.
164
James L Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court:
Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No Fairy
Tale, 41 FAM. L. Q. 249, 270–71 (2007).
165
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2009). Debts owed under § 523(a)(15) differ
in Chapter 13 from DSOs in another way, the failure of the debtor to pay
DSOs that become due after a Chapter 13 petition is filed is cause for a
Chapter 13 case to be converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1307(c)(11) (2009).
162
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or treating them as dischargeable non-support obligations.
However, this flaw is minimized because so few bankruptcies
are actually discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 166 Section
1328(a) provides:
“(a) . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section
502 of this title, except any debt –
....
(2) of the kind specified in section 507 (a)(8)(C) or in
paragraph (1)(B), (1)(C), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), or (9)
of section 523 (a); . . . .”
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) is noticeably, and illogically
excluded from this list. Non-support divorce-related debts are
non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 cases, and also under
§ 1328(b), which is the hardship discharge under Chapter
13. 167 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c) provides:
“(c) A discharge granted under subsection (b) of this section
discharges the debtor from all unsecured debts provided for
by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title,
except any debt –
....
(2) of a kind specified in section 523 (a) of this title.”
This inconsistency between Code sections makes little
sense and should be corrected by Congress.

166

Based on the Federal Judiciary Bankruptcy Statistics, which states
that only thirty percent of bankruptcies are historically filed as Chapter 13
cases, and of these only one-third of Chapter 13 cases are discharged, or
roughly ten percent of the whole. See, infra, page 30 and notes 167–68.
167
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2009).
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In the meantime, the number of bankruptcies falling into
this inconsistency are very limited. Of the roughly one
million Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer bankruptcies
filed in 2008, a little over thirty percent were filed under
Chapter 13. 168 Since historically only one-third of Chapter 13
bankruptcies are discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), 169 it
means that roughly only ten percent of consumer bankruptcy
cases will fall under § 1328(a). Thus, the vast majority of
divorce-related claims involving attorney fees fall cleanly
into the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) exception.
In the small minority of cases that remain, the courts
would be left with two choices, treat the debt as a nondischargeable support and give the attorney a set of keys to
the domestic support kingdom, or find the debt as a
§ 523(a)(15) and risk discharge. If the court chooses the latter
course, the attorney fees would only be dischargeable after
the debtor finished his payment period of three to five
years. 170 As a result, in many of these Chapter 13 cases, the
attorney would receive at least some of the money owed by
the debtor. In any case, under Chapter 13, the attorney would
be no worse off than any other practitioner seeking to collect
fees from a consumer debtor in bankruptcy. Of course, this
leaves open the possibility that the spouse or former spouse
could still remain liable on whatever debt remained. As stated
before, because neither of the solutions is appealing,
168

Raw numbers from Federal Judiciary Bankruptcy Statistics,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/Bankrup
tcyFilings/2008/1208_f2.xls (last visited June 17, 2010). All calculations
are the author’s interpretation of those numbers.
169
“Chapter 13 filing rates remain relatively stable over time at about
30% of total filings. Completion rates hover nationally at about one-third
of confirmed plans . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Bankruptcy by
the Numbers, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/
abi082000ch13.htm (last visited June 17, 2010). These are albeit rough
and less than scientific calculations, but if thirty percent of consumer
bankruptcies are Chapter 13 filings, and of those confirmed plans only
one-third are completed, then the author calculates that roughly ten
percent of consumer bankruptcies are discharged under Chapter 13.
170
Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan requires the debtor to use all
disposable income for the three to five year duration of the plan to pay off
debts. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2009).
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Congress should modify the Code to fix this logical
inconsistency.

CONCLUSION

While some believe BAPCPA was directed in part to
limit the effectiveness of bankruptcy attorneys, 171 if
interpreted too broadly it may have created an unexpected
boon for domestic relations practitioners. If courts continue to
find that attorney fees are DSOs, as it seems the majority of
courts want to do, then enterprising firms may try to use the
apparently expansive language of BAPCPA to get their claws
into estate and exempt property.
Allowing all marital attorney fees awarded against the
debtor to be treated as DSOs could give divorce lawyers
unprecedented access to the bankruptcy estate, hindering the
debtor’s “fresh start” without necessarily helping in
supporting the spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.
This need not occur. In ninety percent of cases, attorney fees
owed to the spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor
upon which the spouse, former spouse, or child remains
liable, can be held as exempt from discharge under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (a)(15), 172 thus enhancing the promise of payment for
the attorney, without turning a payment that goes into an
attorney’s pocket into a domestic support obligation.

171

See generally, Catherine E. Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps
and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 283 (2005).
172
Only roughly ten percent of consumer bankruptcy cases are
discharged under Chapter 13. See discussion supra page 139 and notes
167–68.
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Often the purpose of assessing opponents’ attorney fees is
to balance out the payment between parties who are
economically unequal, where one spouse has a financially
superior position. But filing for bankruptcy is a clear
indication of financial insecurity. The underlying domestic
duty recognized by society in general and codified in the
various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to support the
spouse, former, spouse or child must as a policy remain,
despite the honest but unfortunate debtor’s financial situation.
But in the majority of divorce cases, there is no similarly
compelling societal policy argument for the debtor to support
the attorney of the beneficiary of the domestic support
obligation.

